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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The forest industries of New Zealand and Uruguay are based on forest plantations that have 
evolved as a result of direct forest investment decisions. The paper examines the impact of 
government policy from the perspective of how it may have influenced forest investment 
decisions rather than what the original intent of a government policy, regulation or legislation 
may have been. 
Industrial forest plantations in the southern hemisphere regions of South America and 
Oceania accounted for 16% of the world wood supply in 2005. Within the Oceania region 
New Zealand has evolved from an indigenous forest supply to a plantation industry through a 
combination of direct government investment in plantations and an effective tax deduction 
policy on plantation expenses. In South America Uruguay has created a dynamic, growing 
industry by the afforestation of low quality agricultural land through a combination oftax 
incentives, plantation grants and policies that encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The paper had some key findings supported by literature review and interviews. Investors 
desire stability in a country's economy, their political system and policies and secure land 
ownership rights. Incentive programs can create a critical mass of forest plantations when 
well thought out and implemented. The tax policies of a country were considered the single 
most important investment factor amongst industry experts interviewed. A lack of clarity or 
reasonableness in government policies discourage investment, the application of the 
Resource Management Act in New Zealand is an example of a policy discouraging 
investment. Governments need to consider the impacts of other policies such as agriculture 
subsidies and Emission Trading Schemes on the forest industry. Government can also 
provide important support through infrastructure investments and research and development. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
The countries ofNew Zealand and Uruguay have developed forest industries that are based 
on forest plantations of fast growing exotic pine and eucalyptus species. These two southern 
hemisphere countries have forest industries that exemplify sectors that have evolved as a 
result of direct forest investment decisions and are not reliant on a natural endowment of 
native forests. The prerequisites of plantation based forest industries include having the 
appropriate climate, soil types and the availability of land. The hypothesis of this paper is 
that once the basic biophysical requirements for plantation forestry are met, the actions and 
policies of governments have the ability to significantly impact the evolution of the forest 
industry within their country. 
The review of government policy was performed on a qualitative basis and includes a 
literature review of relevant information on the forest industries of the two countries and 
other southern hemisphere forest industries developed on the forest plantation model. This 
literature review has been supplemented by interviews with selected forest industry experts. 
These experts provided the knowledge and benefits of the extensive operational experience. 
Moreover, the interviewees provided opinions on the effectiveness of various government 
policies and the potential unintended consequences of different policies and actions. The 
paper reviews the impact of government policy from the view of how forest investment 
decisions may have been influenced, regardless of what the motives of a government policy 
may have been. 
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World Wood Supply Background: 
It is important to understand the context of world wood supply and the relative magnitude of 
supply available from the forest industries ofNew Zealand and Uruguay. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2005 Global Forest Resources 
Assessment report has been utilized as a reference for the following background information. 
According to FAO (2005) the total world forested area of3.6 billion hectares has declined at 
annual rate of0.4% between 1990 and 2005 and the area offorest designated primarily for 
production of wood has declined at an annual rate of 0.3 3% over the same period. The area 
of productive forest plantations has been increasing; plantations represented 1.9% of global 
forest area in 1900, 2.4% in 2000, and 2.8% in 2005. Of interest in FAO (2005), China and 
other South East Asian countries have had some of the highest increases in plantation area 
between 1990 and 2005, while countries such as Brazil, Chile and Australia have increased 
their importance as suppliers because their growing stocks per hectare are about double that 
of China. FAO (2005) shows wood removals between 1990 and 2005 have been relatively 
stable at 3 billion cubic meters (m3) annually, with 1.8 billion m3 used for industrial 
roundwood processing and 1.2 billion m3 used for fuelwood. The sources and usage of 
industrial roundwood and fuelwood have shifted significantly between 1990 and 2005. 
Industrial roundwood in 1990 was supplied 40% by North and Central America, 34% by 
Europe, 13% by Asia, 8% by South America, 3% by Africa and 2% by Oceania. In 2005 the 
supply had shifted to 41% supplied by North and Central America, 30% by Europe, 13% by 
South America, 10% by Asia, 4% by Africa and 3% by Oceania, with new South America 
supply compensating for most of the supply declines in Europe and Asia (F AO 2005). 
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Figure 1: Change in Industrial Roundwood Supply between 1990 and 2005 - Percentage of 
Supply 
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FAO (2005) reported a composition offuelwood harvest in 1990 of35% in Africa, 24% in 
South America, 17% in Asia, 12% in North and Central America, 11% in Europe, and 1% in 
Oceania. In 2005 the sourcing of fuel wood shifted to 49% in Africa, 16% in Asia, 15% in 
South America, 10% in Europe, 9% in North and Central America, and 1% in Oceania (F AO 
2005). It can be seen that fuel wood use has dropped significantly in South America, rose 
significantly in Mrica and stayed similar in the rest of the world in this time period. Since 
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most fuel wood is used locally for cooking and heating the use of fuel wood may be related 
more to relative income levels and the availability of alternative energy sources (F AO 2005). 
Country Background: 
New Zealand is a South Pacific Ocean island nation with the two main islands, the North 
Island .and the South Island, lying -between the latitudes of 47 and 33 degrees. New 
Zealand' s nearest major neighbor is Australia, over 2200 kilometers to the west across the 
Tasman Sea. The landscape ofNew Zealand is diverse and rugged, with mountainous areas 
up to 3700 meters elevation while 25% of the land area is less than 200 meters in elevation 
(Rhodes et al2002). The land area of26.9 million hectares is made up of 11.8 million 
hectares of pasture and arable land, 6.2 million hectares of natural forest, 7.1 million hectares 
of other non-forest land and 1.8 million hectares of plantation forest (NZFOA 2008). 
New Zealand became a British colony in 1840, a self-governing dominion in 1907 and a 
fully independent country in 1947. The government ofNew Zealand is modeled on the 
British parliamentary system, which allows a maximum period of five years between 
elections. With two main political parties, an election system of Mixed Member 
Proportional (MMP) representation allows an electorate vote by district for half the seats and 
another proportional popular vote for political parties and their slate of nation- wide 
candidates to be elected. In addition, five seats of the 120 total seats are set aside for Maori 
candidates to be chosen by Maori voters. This type of electoral and parliamentary system 
has the potential to allow minor political parties to gain seats and it increases the possibility 
of coalition or minority governments (Turner et al1996). New Zealand has a population of 
4.2 million people, with a concentration near the city of Auckland (NZFOA 2008). The GDP 
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of New Zealand in 2006 was NZ$98.5 billion (US$ 62.1 billion at 2006 exchange rates-
[BNZ 2009]), and the forest sector was responsible for 3.2% of the GDP and approximately 
10% of its total exports (NZFOA 2008). New Zealand's GDP per capita was US$ 14,786 in 
2006 (NZFOA 2008-). 
Uruguay is situated in the south-eastern part of South America between the latitudes of 30 
and 35 degrees and is bordered by Argentina to the west and south across the Rio de la Plata, 
and to the north by Brazil. The country of 17.6 million hectares has a gently rolling 
topography, with its highest elevation being slightly over 500 meters above sea level 
(Agrawala et al, 2004). 
Uruguay became a colony of Spain in 1680. It attempted to obtain independence a number 
of times, but was not declared an independent country until 1828 when the British helped 
mediate a treaty that established Uruguay as a small independent buffer between the 
emerging continental powers of Argentina and Brazil. Uruguay continued to experience 
military influences from its neighbours and economic influences from the British throughout 
the 1800s and 1900s. During a period of economic down turn in the mid-1960s a 
dictatorship government took control of the country. This evolved into a military 
dictatorship and with associated human right abuses. This period finally ended with the 
democratic election of a leader from one of the two traditional political parties in 1984. 
Under the present constitution ofUruguay there is a general legislative assembly and a 
senate, the legislature and the President are determined by proportional representation of the 
popular vote. Elections take place every five years, there are now three main political parties 
and Uruguay is presently governed by a left of center party (Bao et al 2002). Uruguay has a 
population of 3.4 million people concentrated near Montevideo the capital (Agrawala et al, 
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2004). The GDP ofUruguay in 2005 was US$ 16.8 billion (Morey et al2006), with the 
agricultural sector contributing to 9% of GDP but 85% of all exports. Approximately two-
thirds of the GDP is related to the internal service sectors of trade, tourism, financial and 
other services (Agrawala et al, 2004). Uruguay's GDP per capita in 2005 was US$ 4,941 
(Morey et al2006). The economic contribution ofthe forest sector is relatively modest but 
growing fast, with the total harvest increasing from 2.9 million m3 in 2000 to 7.2 million m3 
in 2007, and the export value of forest products increasing from US$ 85.2 million in 2000 to 
US$ 221 million in 2006 (MGAP- Direccion General Forestal2009). The forest sector 
contributed to only 4% of total export values in 2005, but the forest sector export values are 
estimated to experience a fivefold increase from the 2005 level by the year 2015 (Snoeck et 
al2009). 
Country Forest Industry History: 
New Zealand varies from Uruguay in that it has a much lengthier forest industry history and 
a history of various incentives and subsidies to encourage afforestation and development of 
the forest industry. After the 1840s European settlers engaged in extensive land clearing for 
agriculture to the point that by 1920 it was estimated that two-thirds (11.9 million hectares) 
of original forested land area had been cleared (Rhodes et al 2002). In the 1890s, the first 
afforestation efforts started; this was primarily due to concerns regarding depletion of future 
wood supply from the indigenous forests. The New Zealand government offered seedlings at 
cost; and two acres of barren land were offered for every acre of private land planted by 
owners (Rhodes et al 2002). The government also used prison labour for planting and by 
1919 a total of 16,000 hectares of exotic species had been planted (Rhodes et al 2002). The 
next focused afforestation effort occurred between 1925 and 1934, with a resulting 288,000 
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hectares planted. Private industry and individuals contributed 68,000 hectares to this total. 
The government supplied seedlings at cost and also provided extension services to small 
landowners, while larger private corporations benefited from the government research and 
development of silvics and plantation management (Rhodes et al 2002). From this period 
until 1960, only 55,000 hectares were planted, with private owners contributing 
approximately 30% to the total. The New Zealand government demonstrated and developed 
the forest industry capacity for milling radiata pine (Pinus radiata) during this period by 
starting two sawmills, offering long-term, cheap supplies of government timber to mills, and 
by providing protective policies of export lumber quotas and import lumber tariffs. As a 
result of these efforts, in 1960 the harvest from plantation forests exceeded the harvest from 
indigenous forests for the first time (Rhodes et al 2002). From the 1940s to 1969, the New 
Zealand government offered farmers tax incentives through the expensing of tree plantations 
and spreading out of income. These incentives were largely unsuccessful due to price 
controls on timber, the cheap interest loans and forgivable loan portions added to programs 
in the 1960s contributed only modestly to increased levels of planting (Rhodes et al 2002). 
Variations of loan and grant programs continued until 1984, with a total of 20,000 hectares 
of new plantations attributed to the loan program, and 100,000 hectares attributed to the grant 
program over this time period. During the same time period forest industrial land owners 
could expense plantation costs against current income, but were not eligible for the loan and 
grant programs. Between 1960 and 1984, the government planted 354,000 hectares and 
private owners planted 361,000 hectares (Rhodes et al 2002). In 1984, all incentive 
programs ended, but both small land owners and industrial forest owners became able to 
deduct plantation establishment and maintenance expenses against other current income for 
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tax purposes. After a brief period of revoking the plantation expensing, the expensing was 
re-established in 1991, and it remains current tax policy. This re-establishment coincided 
with the New Zealand government's privatization and deregulation period that substantially 
reduced afforestation and capital spending on forest processing facilities as the forest 
industry adjusted to new cost and competition realities (Rhodes et al 2002). A 1991 New 
Zealand Forest Accord included additional measures to conserve indigenous forest and by 
2001, the commercial harvest of indigenous forest on Crown land had ended (Rhodes et al 
2002). Currently small volumes of native indigenous forest are potentially available on small 
private land parcels or on Maori land (Rhodes et al2002). 
Figure 2: Forest Plantations in New Zealand, total hectares 1900-2008. 
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Uruguay's commercial forest industry commenced in the mid-twentieth century with 
plantations established by domestic pension funds, small pulp mills, o~her private investors, 
and the national utility company (Agrawala et al 2004). The first law on commercial forest 
plantations (Law No. 13723) was enacted in 1967, and it provided incentives through a 
partial exemption on income tax proportional to the annual planted area. When the law 
ended in 1979, an average of 1,100 ha/year had been planted (Agrawala et al2004). In 1987 
a forest promotion policy (Law No. 15939) was enacted and continues to the present day 
with some amendments (Agrawala et al 2004). Uruguay in 1987 wanted to create new 
sources for exports, create a sustainable supply of fuel wood and to halt the deforestation of 
its native forests. In 1988 Uruguay had 31,000 hectares of plantations of mixed quality 
scattered around the country (Agrawala et al 2004). In 2008, Uruguay had plantations of 
745,000 hectares and a dynamic, expanding forest industry (Forestal Web 2009). The native 
forest area, without cutting pressure, has grown from 667,000 in 1970 to 810,000 hectares in 
2004 (Agrawala et al 2004). The Uruguayan 1987 forest promotion law created significant 
investment, much of it FDI, totaling over US$ 2 billion in the last two decades (Snoeck et al 
2009). Initially in the 1990's the majority of that investment was in land and plantations but 
with the completion of the Metsa Bonia pulp mill in late 2007 the present cumulative ratio is 
approximately two-thirds in industrial plants and infrastructure and one-third in investments 
of land and plantations (Snoeck et al 2009). 
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Figure 3: Forest Plantations in Uruguay - total hectares 1970-2008. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW: 
II l-lectares 
The review of existing literature is organized with respect to the themes or questions used 
during the interviewing of industry experts. Topics included the effectiveness and 
importance of country forest investment incentive programs, the importance of country 
labour laws, the importance of country environment laws, the importance of country tax 
policies, the most important government policies or actions that encourage and discourage 
forest investment, and other government policy areas that are important to forest investment 
decisions. 
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The review emphasizes literature that is specifically related to the countries of New Zealand 
and Uruguay, but it also covers relevant material from other southern hemisphere forest 
industries. 
Incentive Programs: 
Latin American countries have suffered from capital market imperfections that have resulted 
in a high capital cost and lack of liquidity for forest management projects (Haltia et al 1997). 
Haltia et al (1997) recommend that if incentives are used, that they be targeted and cost-
effective with just enough money offered to cover the marginal cost of adopting forested land 
uses. Incentives should be temporary (to prevent a dependency relationship), they should 
take into account cultural and social factors, they should be flexible decrees (not laws) and 
they should allow for the future recovery of expenditures indirectly through taxes and fees 
(Haltia et all997). Other justification for incentives or subsidies identified by Haltia et al 
(1997) are for the establishment of a critical mass of plantations needed for a competitive 
forest industry, or the "jump starting" of the initial development of plantations for industrial 
or social forestry purposes. 
Laarman (1997) noted that reforestation projects in Brazil and Costa Rica had been 
motivated more by tax considerations than by the future long-term return on investment. In 
comparison, Chile's public-private cost sharing of plantation establishment was believed to 
be successful from both the private and social perspective. It was recommended that 
initiatives be supported by a rigorous study of financial, economic, social (equity), and 
environmental benefits and costs (Laarman 1997). 
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The United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) suggested that financing strategies relying on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) need stable policy and institutional environments that include 
secure ownership rights and coherent forest policies. Attracting FDI will remain evasive, 
even if subsidies and incentives are present, when the policy environment is insecure and 
unpredictable (Tomaselli 2006). 
The Uruguayan 1987 forest promotion law created significant investment (much of it FDI), 
totaling over US$ 2 billion over the last two decades (Snoeck et al 2009). In 2004, 
investment capital sources in the Uruguayan forest industry development were estimated as 
coming 45% from foreign principal and secondary activities and 55% from local or domestic 
principal and secondary activities (Pike 2005). The essential features of the 1987 forest 
promotion law are described in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Uruguay Forestry promotion policy based on Law No. 15939 (1987) 
Forestry growth to be based on projects subject to approval by Forestry Bureau designated as the National 
Forestry Authority. Eligibility criteria include location, tree species and planting density. 
The regulation promotes forests to be established on "Forestry Priority Soils". These soils include 3.6 million 
ha of low agricultural productivity and/or high susceptibility to erosion or degradation, located in certain areas 
of the country with potential to develop timber production, transport and manufacturing centres. A package of 
fmancial incentives was offered to prospect investors, including: 
- land property tax exemption for all planted areas 
- permanent exemption of income tax and other taxes and levies 
- 12 year exemption of any new taxes or levies to be created 
- a cash subsidy equivalent to 50% of estimated plantation cost ( phased out 2005) 
- duty free import of goods to be applied to approved projects 
- soft credits for planting, with a grace period of 10 years for both principal and interest payments 
- corporations allowed to buy land if forestry is main activity (otherwise nominative, requirement eliminated 
1998) 
-forest ownership separated from land ownership, allowing for land rental agreements of up to 30 years 
-investors allowed to deduct up to 30% of their income tax payments from other activities on investments made 
in forestry projects 
Prohibition of harvesting native forests, with the exception of wood supply for farms and properly justified 
cases, subject to approval by Forestry Bureau. 
Enforcement of a number of ftre and pest prevention measures. 
Climate change beneftts to be determined for C02 offsetting. 
(Adapted from Agrawala et al2004) 
13 
New Zealand has a history of various incentives and subsidies to encourage afforestation and 
development ofthe forest industry. In the 1890's the first afforestation efforts started, with 
the New Zealand government offering seedlings at cost and additional Crown land for 
private land planted by owners. The government also used prison labour for planting 
(Rhodes et al2002). The next focused afforestation effort happened between 1925 and 1934, 
with 288,000 hectares planted. Private industry and individuals contributed 68,000 hectares 
to that total. The government contributed seedlings at cost and extension services to small 
landowners, while larger private corporations benefited from the government research and 
development (Rhodes et al 2002). After this period the New Zealand government 
demonstrated and developed the forest industry capacity for milling radiata pine (Pinus 
radiata) and had policies of export lumber quotas and import lumber tariffs (Rhodes et al 
2002). From the 1940's to 1969 the New Zealand govelnment offered farmers tax incentives 
through expensing tree plantations and spreading out income. These incentives were largely 
unsuccessful because of price controls on timber (Rhodes et al 2002). Variations of loan and 
grant programs continued until 1984. During the same time period forest industrial land 
owners could expense plantation costs against current income but were not eligible for the 
loan and grant programs. Between 1960 and 1984 the government planted 354,000 hectares 
and private owners planted 361 ,000 hectares (Rhodes et al 2002). In 1984 all incentive 
programs ended but both small land owners and industrial forest owners became able to 
deduct plantation establishment and maintenance expenses against other current income for 
tax purposes. After a brief period of revoking the plantation expensing, it was re-established 
in 1991 and remains current tax policy (Rhodes et al2002). 
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In summary, forest investment incentive programs can be effective if they are targeted to 
create a critical mass of plantations for a competitive forest industry. The costs and benefits 
from an economic, social and environmental perspective need to be considered, and there 
needs to be a stable policy environment and land ownership rights within the country to 
attract FDI. 
New Zealand utilized an incentive policy of subsidization of planting and of extension 
services to encourage afforestation on small land holdings between the 1890s and 1984 with 
modest results. The ability to expense plantation establishment and maintenance costs 
against current taxable income that was first given solely to large landowners and then later 
extended to all landowners in 1991 has been New Zealand's most effective incentive to 
encourage plantation establishment. The New Zealand government helped establish the 
critical mass for a plantation based forest industry by planting half of all the plantation 
forests up to 1984, and by providing research and development support in silvics, 
manufacturing and marketing. 
Uruguay attempted its first forest investment incentive program in 1967 with a law that 
allowed tax credits for the establishment of plantations; this initiative encouraged the 
planting of approximately 30,000 hectares. A forest promotion law enacted in 1987 offering 
plantation grants and tax exemptions has been successful in growing the total plantation area 
to 745,000 hectares by 2008, and had attracted over US$ 900 million in investment by 2004. 
FDI made up 45% of this total through the initial period and was closer to 75% in 2009 as 
the manufacturing plants are built to consume the wood from the plantations. Total 
investment currently exceeds US$ 2 billion. 
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Country Labour Laws: 
New Zealand, prior to 1984, had a long tradition of utilizing government operated enterprises 
to develop the country and to increase the welfare of the people. The New Zealand Forest 
Service managed indigenous forests and government owned plantations with a large number 
of employees, subsidized plantation management to relieve unemployment and provided low 
cost housing (Hall 1997). These policies ended with privatization of government enterprises 
and deregulation, beginning in 1984, precipitated by a crisis of government debt and a 
change in ideological direction (Hall 1997). Numerous regulations in price, wage and 
income controls were removed along with the subsidies (O'Loughlin 2005). 
Between 1984 and 1992, the labour productivity increased by 23% and the total employment 
decreased by 29% in the New Zealand forest industry. Over 100 new mills were established 
as small outdated mills were replaced (Grebner et al 2000). Grebner et al (2000) states that 
"the reforms were crucial in encouraging outside investment into the forest sector, allowing 
the New Zealand economy to exploit the comparative advantage in growing wood." 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has developed an index to measure the 
investment climate in the forest sector of its member countries. The Forest Investment 
Attractiveness Index (IAIF) measures supra-sectorial, inter-sectorial and intra-sectorial 
factors in developing the IAIF, with labour being one of the many inter-sectorial factors 
(Tomaselli 2006). In assessing the financing of Uruguay's forestry sector, Mendell et al 
(2007) listed the country's highly literate trained forestry professionals and a literacy rate of 
98% as some ofUruguay's desirable attributes. 
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In summary, labour policies are an indicator of investment climate. Desirable features for 
investors include flexibility in a country's labour regulations, a trained work force and high 
educational and literacy standards within the country. 
Country Environment Laws: 
When multi-national forest companies establish forest operations in developing countries, 
they typically bring environmental practices and standards with them. When Weyerhaeuser 
Inc (Weyerhaeuser) initiated forest operations in Uruguay in 1996 they introduced riparian 
guidelines . and worker safety rules that were new to the country. To monitor the 
environmental impacts of their forest operations, Weyerhaeuser also funded a base line 
environmental study (performed in cooperation with North Carolina State University) of two 
grassland watersheds, one as a control and the other in pine and eucalyptus plantations 
(Meacham 2003). Haltia (1997) concludes that if the right policies are followed, forest-
based industrialization can promote conservation by enabling forests to outcompete 
alternative land uses. 
Uruguay's forest promotion law of 1987 conserved the native forest and allowed for an 
increase of approximately 20% of land area in native forest between 1970 and 2004 by 
reducing native fuel wood use (Agrawala et al2004). 
The trend towards third party certification by groups such as the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) on international forest plantations leads to homogeneity of environmental standards 
from country to country. For example in Chile, Japanese pulp and paper companies have 
established their own plantations to supply FSC-certified pulp logs and wood chips to their 
pulp mills in Japan (Campino 2005). Pure play Timber Investment Management 
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Organizations (TIMO's) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT's) are in the review of the 
environmental movement to manage their land responsibly which can create the desire for a 
"social licence" such as FSC certification (Sande 2002). 
The New Zealand environmental regulatory situation was influenced by local councils in the 
1970s with respect to their prevailing attitudes against forestry by farmers and the protection 
of land for agriculture (Rhodes et al2002). The Resource Management Act (RMA) of 1991 
consolidated a number of acts, including the Town and Country Planning Act of 1977 and 
the RMA was expected to simplify administration. Instead, the RMA is frequently criticized 
as having a high cost and a lengthy time incurred in seeking consent, particularly for the 
wood processing industries (Rhodes et al 2002). The RMA is described as a "national 
framework defining sustainable management and requiring that, beneath this framework 
regional authorities implement detailed plans establishing the broad variety of thresholds 
which are deemed to constitute sustainable management" (Brown 1997). Most major 
plantation owners and conservation groups signed the 1991 New Zealand Forest Accord, 
which was updated in 2007 (NZFOA 2008). The accord is an agreement that includes; 
defining the areas unsuitable for forestry, the acknowledgement that existing forest should be 
maintained, recognizing commercial forests as essential, a commitment to ensure any use of 
wood from indigenous forests is on a sustainable, value-added basis and ensuring that new 
plantation forests will not disturb areas of natural indigenous vegetation (NZFOA 2008). 
For purposes of meeting obligations under the 2002 Kyoto Protocol, the New Zealand 
government made a decision that the carbon sequestration on industrial plantations 
established pre-1990 belonged to the government. Harvesting of plantations could trigger a 
deforestation tax if the areas were not replanted, and the New Zealand Forest Owners 
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Association (NZFOA) estimated that the proposed legislation stripped NZ$ 3 billion of value 
from forest plantations planted prior to 1990 (Dover 2008). This proposed deforestation tax, 
(related to the government Emission Trading Scheme [ETS]), reduced new planting and 
replanting, delayed capital decisions on mill processing, and was opposed by New Zealand 
Greenpeace over the concern that it would not stop the conversion of plantations to dairy 
farms (Dover 2008). The new National government elected in November 2008 is delaying 
and reviewing implementation of the carbon tax policies (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). 
In summary, environment laws of countries are converging to more common international 
standards due to the significant presence of multi-national forest companies and TIMOs in 
southern hemisphere forest countries. The certification of plantations and industrial 
operations by third party groups such as FSC has encouraged this move towards 
commonality. The forest environment laws in Uruguay have not discouraged investment. 
The 1991 Resource Management Act (RMA) in New Zealand has discouraged investment 
(particularly in manufacturing plants), through its lengthy and sometimes unpredictable 
approval process. Emission trading schemes and carbon sequestration associated with forest 
plantations has become a contentious issue in New Zealand after the government claimed 
ownership of some of the carbon credits and planned legislation that would tax landowners 
for failure to replant. 
Country Tax Policies: 
In improving the climate for investment, particularly in developing countries, taxes are 
identified as an important supra-sectorial factor in the IADB Forest Investment 
Attractiveness Index (IAIF) (Tomaselli 2006). 
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Uruguay had limited success with its 1969 tax deductibility of plantation establishment (Law 
No. 13723) and thus modeled the incentives of the forest promotion law of 1987 (Law No. 
15939) on the Chilean incentive program and other country incentive programs that had been 
considered successful in encouraging forest plantation investment (Agrawala et al 2004). 
The tax policy incentives included exemption from property taxes, a 12-year tax holiday on 
earnings from plantations, and the ability for Uruguayan tax payers to deduct 30% of 
plantation establishment costs against other income. These tax incentives formed part of an 
overall incentive program that is believed to have attracted over US$ 900 million of 
investment during the 1990's (Agrawala et al 2004). In 1998 Uruguay introduced (Law No. 
16906); this law clarified that foreign investors have the same rights as domestic investors, it 
clarified the movement of currency and repatriation of profits by foreign investors, it 
provided fixed duration tax holidays for projects of national interest, and it provided free 
trade zones for manufacturers exporting all their products (Mendell 2007). This law, along 
with its associated tax policies, was important in the establishment of the US$ 1.1 billion 
Metsa Bonia pulp mill, commencing operations in 2007 and the ENCE wood chipping and 
port facilities, established in 2002 and later. The Finnish and Spanish pulp and paper 
companies took advantage of the free trade zone that, (with the exception of social security 
taxes on workers), exempted them from all taxes (Mendell 2007). Weyerhaeuser plantation 
and manufacturing investments qualified as projects of national interest. The new law helped 
reduce country specific risk, and provided Weyerhaeuser with a level of comfort that their 
investments were important to the government of Uruguay (pers. comm. Weyerhaeuser 
executive 2008). 
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Uruguay has one of the smallest populations and economies within South America (Morey et 
al 2006). Over the last 70 years, the investment ratio as a percentage of GDP has been an 
anemic 1. 7%; this has been attributed to a previously socialized, protected economy and a 
domestic non-trade sector that composes over two thirds of the economy (Morey et al 2006). 
Uruguay was achieving progress in increasing the investment ratio, with initiatives 
previously described, when the currency crisis in Brazil and Argentina between 1999 and 
2002 then impacted into Uruguay's economy. Emergency funding from the International 
Monetary Fund and loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)and World 
Bank pushed government debt to 92% of GDP by 2004 (Morey et al 2006). In cooperative 
plans with the IADB (which holds 39% of Uruguayan public debt), the government has plans 
to increase the investment ratio from 14% in 2004 to 18% by 2009, and to reduce 
government debt to 59% of GDP by 2009. The multitude of government initiatives designed 
to achieve these goals include lightening the business tax burden by simplifying the tax 
system, spreading the burden over a larger base by including an establishment of personal 
income taxes and by improving tax administration and tax evasion rates. This illustrates the 
importance of establishing an export based economy, of getting the tax policy correct and the 
limited flexibility the Uruguayan government has with its high foreign debt levels (Morey et 
al2006). 
New Zealand had a post-WWII economy that was thriving on agricultural exports and had a 
GNP per capita in 1950 that was second only to Switzerland (Brown 1997). By 1984, the 
New Zealand government had become heavily indebted due to protective, socialistic policies 
that included market inference through tariffs, quotas, subsidies and labour market 
inflexibility. Government debt was at 50% of GDP in 1984 and it was at this time that tax 
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reforms and policies towards a market oriented economy were initiated by the New Zealand 
government (Brown 1997). The government introduced a flat tax system with a user pay 
philosophy, but government debt continued to rise, peaking in 1987 at 79% of GDP (Hall 
1997). It took some additional time, but by 1995 government debt was at 30% of GDP, 
inflation was at 2%, unemployment at 6% and GDP was growing at a rate of 6.5% (Brown 
1997). The New Zealand government had regained policy flexibility, including the ability to 
use tax policy to influence investment and the general economy (Brown 1997). 
AS-mentioned in the incentive section of this paper, the New Zealand government offered 
farmers various tax schemes between 1949 and 1969 to encourage plantation establishment. 
Timber price controls persisted until 1965 and these controls overwhelmed the economics of 
the. potential tax -benefits (Rhodes et al 2002). During this same period industrial forest 
plantation owners could deduct establishment and maintenance expenses against other 
current income. In 1984, this tax deductibility was extended to small land owners and then 
revoked for all classes ofland owners in 1987. In 1991, the tax deductibility was reinstated 
and exists in much the same form presently. Plantation establishment rates increased 
significantly from 1984 to 1987, dropped dramatically from 1988 to 1991, and then increased 
rapidly from 1992 onwards (Rhodes et al2002). 
The forestry plantation taxation regime allows for the expenses of plantation establishment, 
pruning, thinning, planning, road maintenance and certain administrative expenses to be 
deducted in the year they are incurred (Campbell et al 2001). The capital expense of a land 
and plantation purchase cannot be expensed, nor can the cost of timber cutting rights 
acquired. These costs are instead matched against the harvest revenue when the timber is 
cut, along with any road development or administrative costs that were not allowed to be 
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expensed as they occurred. A tax payer can also spread the income from timber sales over a 
period of four years for tax purposes (Campbell et al2001). 
Tax policies are an important consideration for any country; however the emergence of 
REITs and TIMOs as major holders of forest plantations in the United States and the 
southern hemisphere has altered some of the influence of local governments in regards to tax 
policies. REITs can be organized to have earnings taxed as capital gains at a maximum rate 
of 20%, and TIMOs often manage institutional funds that do not attract tax. These two 
categories of owners can organize themselves to minimize taxes, (even in foreign 
jurisdictions), to a greater extent than traditional .forest industry corporations (Sande 2002). 
In the privatization ofNew Zealand's government plantation forests between 1990 and 1996, 
the amount of foreign ownership increased to 18% from a previous amount of less than 2% 
in the 1980s (O'Loughlin 2005). The first TIMO invested in New Zealand in 1991 and over 
time, the TIMOs have accumulated plantations from domestic forest companies and foreign 
forest companies, resulting in their holding of over 70% of New Zealand's industrial 
plantations by 2006 (NZFOA 2008). TIMOs arrived later in Uruguay than in New Zealand, 
with the first TIMO entering a joint venture with Weyerhaeuser in 1996 (Pike Commercial 
2008). In 2007 TIMOs held over 25% of Uruguay's plantations, with forest companies 
having a greater interest in owning their timber supply directly, compared to New Zealand. 
This characteristic is attributed to a desire for supply security before commencing large 
capital manufacturing investments and to prevalent attitudes towards ownership amongst 
Latin American forest companies (Pike Commercial 2008) 
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In summary, tax policies encouraging forest investment require governments that have the 
financial flexibility and means to accomplish them. New Zealand reached a peak 
government debt of 79% of GDP in 1987, while Uruguay reached a peak government debt of 
92% of GDP in 2004. Both countries needed to reduce their debt (much of it held 
internationally), in order to sustain incentivizing tax policies. 
Plantation establishment rates in New Zealand had significant increases between 1984 and 
1987 when all land owners could expense establishment and maintenance costs, a sharp 
decrease in planting between 1988 and 1991 when the tax incentive was revoked, and a large 
increase in planting from 1992 to the early 2000s when the taxation regime was reinstated. 
In Uruguay, tax incentives alone in 1967 were not enough to encourage significant plantation 
investment. The forest promotion law in 1987, which included plantation grants, tax 
exemptions and holidays provided the incentives to attract the FDI that was needed. 
Additional laws in 1998 that clarified the rights of foreign investors, provided limited 
duration tax holidays for projects of national interest and created free trade zones for export 
oriented businesses, attracted more FDI, particularly in the area of manufacturing. 
TIMOs and REITs have a tax advantage over traditional forest companies and can be 
organized to pay little or no tax even in foreign countries. TIMOs own over 70% of forest 
plantations in New Zealand and over 25% of plantations in Uruguay. 
Government Policies and Actions Encouraging Forest Investment: 
Tomaselli (2006) indicates that an encouraging climate for investment in a country includes 
stable economy and policy environments, secure ownership rights and coherent forest 
policies towards sustainable forest management. Government-attributed elements of success 
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in developing forest plantations and industry in Chile include political and macroeconomic 
stability, trade liberalization and open foreign investment, stable property rights for land with 
and without trees, a credible government with adequate institutional capacity to enforce laws, 
the administering of possible incentive schemes and the provision of proper technologies and 
basic infrastructure (Haltia et al 1997). Similar comments by Rhodes et al (2002) suggest 
that forest investment is encouraged by good governance, clear land tenure arrangements, 
national security, and market development. 
New Zealand employed a number of the elements described above in its decision to sell most 
of the timber rights to the 550,000 hectares of government owned plantations between 1990 
and 1996. The sale created competition for timber supply and access to foreign capital 
required to modernize the timber processing industry (O'Loughlin 2005). The 1840 Treaty 
of Waitangi guaranteed continued Maori ownership of their land and other natural resources 
(O'Loughlin 2005). In 1989, a mutual agreement between the government and Maori tribal 
leadership agreed to sell only the tree crops, with an option for a second rotation. The 
agreement also stated that annual land rental payments would be put into a trust to be paid 
out to any successful land claimants, and that land could be reverted back to Maori 
ownership if necessary after tree rights ended. This provided the certainty needed for 
investors and forest companies to bid on the sale tenders (O'Loughlin 2005). Another 
example of providing certainty was the New Zealand government's clarifying tax policy in 
1991, which allowed all plantation owners to deduct establishment and maintenance 
expenses against current income (Rhodes et al2002). 
Morey et al (2006) identify Uruguay as a mature democracy; with political parties operating 
in an essentially consensual nature, the rule of law is firmly embedded, there is a respect for 
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property rights and there are high caliber public institutions. The Uruguay forest promotion 
law of 1987 (Law No. 15939) and the 1998 legislation (Law No. 16906) to promote national 
and foreign direct investment, along with political stability and membership in MERCOSUR, 
are government actions that Mendell (2007) credits for Uruguay's success in fmancing its 
forestry sector. 
In summary, investors desire stability in a country's economy, political system, policies, and 
secure land ownership rights. Both New Zealand and Uruguay have demonstrated success 
in attracting investment when they met these conditions. 
Government Policies and Actions Discouraging Forest Investment: 
Risk and uncertainty are particularly important with respect to the long time period involved 
in forestry investments (Tomaselli 2006). The IADB Forest Investment Attractiveness Index 
lists countries periodically by their measured attractiveness and their potential investment 
attractiveness, which are based on the country's commitment to change. Country 
government policies or actions that discourage potential attractiveness include high tax rates, 
political risk, lack of trade openness, required licences and permits, the state of social and 
economic infrastructure, the presence of subsidizing agricultural policies that discourage 
forestry, planting and harvesting restrictions, unfavorable treatment of capital, lack ofrule of 
law and other adverse actions (Nascimento 2006). Rhodes et al (2002), note that country 
disincentives can be more powerful than country incentives. 
New Zealand requires consent by the Overseas Investment Commission (OIC) when any 
significant assets are to be acquired by a foreigner; which by defmition could be as little as 
five hectares or less if foreshore is involved (Story et al2001). OIC consent is not required 
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for the acquisition of a forestry right, a right to harvest a crop of trees or to acquire Maori 
freehold land. The OIC applies an investor test of suitability and a review of national interest 
that is lengthy in consideration and open-ended (Story et al 2001). The OIC consent could 
be seen as a discouraging factor for FDI and the national interest test has been used to block 
pastoral conversion to plantation forest (Story et al2001). 
In 2006, Uruguay issued Decree No. 452/988 in conjunction with the 2005 phasing out of the 
plantation grant that formed a portion of the forest promotion law of 1987 (Forestal Web 
2009). This Decree established the need for an environmental review of any new proposed 
plantation to consider the technical considerations of the species to be planted, to promote 
new species with greater productivity and to watch the development of forests in 
consideration of the traditional farmer (Forestal Web 2009). The reasoning behind the 
regulation change was to prevent the planting of higher value agricultural land once the 
plantation grant was no longer available to help direct plantation establishment to the lower 
productivity agricultural land. The introduction of the regulation change initially caused 
large delays because the government did not have the manpower or expertise to enforce the 
standards. Rules have now been clarified, government manpower has been added and land 
owners will generally know in advance if their potential plantation will get approved. 
However, in the interim the plantation establishment rate slowed (pers. comm. Enrich 2009). 
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In summary, country disincentives can sometimes be more powerful than incentives, with 
risk and uncertainty being very important in a long term investments undertaken in the forest 
industry. High tax rates, political risk, lack of infrastructure, restrictions on forest 
investments or capital movements, and lack of rule of law would all potentially discourage 
forest investment. 
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Other Government Policies: 
A number of countries have employed agricultural subsidies that have encouraged the 
conversion of forest land to agriculture and that have discouraged forest use (Laarman 1997). 
In New Zealand, the removal of agricultural subsidies and export incentives after 1984 made 
approximately 1.5 million hectares marginal or uneconomic for agriculture. This land 
needed new uses, so land prices were reduced and the profitability of afforestation was 
increased. This separate policy move had an unquantifiable, but likely significant influence 
on plantation establishment rates (Rhodes et al 2002). 
The decision by the New Zealand government to claim ownership of carbon sequestration on 
private forest plantations caused distrust by forest owners and a reduced investment in 
plantations and wood processing (Dover 2008). An estimated 25.5 metric tonne (Mt) C02 
was sequestered in New Zealand plantation forests in 2005 (NZFOA 2008). In Uruguay the 
1982 Soil Management Law resulted in an annual carbon sequestered in soil of 6.6 Mt C02 
(Agrawala et al 2004). The cumulative net carbon sequestration by forestry plantations 
between 1988 and 2000 was 27.4 Mt C02 and an additional 108.6 Mt C02 is projected for 
the period of2001-2012. Total carbon sequestration from sectoral policies in agriculture and 
forestry already sequester about 2.5 times the annual C02 emissions in Uruguay (Agrawala 
et a12004). The benefit of carbon sequestration has not been monetized, but it has also not 
penalized or hindered investments in the forest industry. 
In summary, government policies regarding other industries such as agriculture can have a 
positive or negative effect on forest investments. Also broader government policies like 
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greenhouse gas emissions can impact forest investments, particularly with the issue of carbon 
sequestration in forest plantations. 
METHODOLOGY: 
This paper' s qualitative review on the impact of government policy on the evolution of the 
forest industries of New Zealand and Uruguay is based on information obtained through 
literature review and through interviews with selected industry experts. The literature review 
information search was focused on the influences of government policy on the evolution of 
the two respective forest industries in New Zealand and Uruguay, but it also considered the 
general policies and issues that are common to southern hemisphere forest industries. The 
literature review has pointed to some of the macro-level impacts of government policies. 
However, to get a better understanding of the dynamics of policy interventions, this study 
contributes to the literature by interviewing forest industry executives and experts. This 
group is often overlooked when the efficacy of government policy is discussed and this can 
be an important oversight. Forest company executives are the ones who respond to and make 
decisions on the basis of government policy. By taking their views and experiences into 
account, we can gain a better understanding of the impacts of forest policy. The methodology 
adopted in this paper will therefore meet its purpose of providing an industry perspective on 
forest policy. 
The literature review covered the same subject issue areas as the interviews with industry 
experts. The review was organized by the subject issue areas of government incentive 
programs, country labour laws, country environment laws, country tax policies, policies that 
encourage or discourage ongoing or future forest investment and other government policy 
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areas that can affect the forest industry. The literature review research includes very general 
information on the socio-economic, cultural, and physical characteristics of the countries of 
New Zealand and Uruguay to help illustrate the comparative advantages the two countries 
may have been endowed with in regards to their respective forest industries. Finally, the 
literature review also considers global forest industry trends in terms of ownership type, 
global forest product supply, and demand in the context of New Zealand's and Uruguay's 
forest industries. 
The potential interviewee participants for the paper were selected based on their extensive 
knowledge of southern hemisphere forestry and their particular knowledge of the forest 
industries of New Zealand and Uruguay. The potential interviewees were initially contacted 
by telephone or by email. Potential interviewees were identified by manner of the author's 
previous meetings with the potential interviewees or by manner of introduction from other 
forestry colleagues of the author. Overall, a total of eight forest industry experts were 
selected to be interviewed for this paper. All interviewees had good knowledge of the forest 
industries of New Zealand, Uruguay and southern hemisphere forestry. Four interviewees 
had extensive experience in both countries, two interviewees had experience more 
specialized in New Zealand and two interviewees had experience more specialized in 
Uruguay. Length of field experience ranged between 16 years and 37 years. All 
interviewees were forestry professionals; three hold Masters in Forestry and one interviewee 
has a PhD in Forestry and Environmental Studies. 
The interviews with forest industry experts were conducted between December 2008 and 
February 2009. The interviews followed reviewed protocol and all interviewees were asked 
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the same eight topic questions. The following protocols were followed in conducting the 
interviews: 
- All interviews are voluntary and an interviewee can withdraw at any time. 
- Suggested questions were forwarded by email to the interviewees before the interview was 
conducted. 
- Interviews were conducted by telephone or email because of physical distances between the 
interviewer and interviewee. 
- Interviewees had the option of remaining anonymous (one interviewee chose this option). 
- Draft notes of the interview conducted were sent to the interviewees for review of errors or 
omissions before the interview notes were used to form any of the content of the paper. 
- The interview notes would be kept in a locked filing cabinet, and all interview notes will be 
shredded six months after the fmal presentation and acceptance of the MBA Project Paper by 
the MBA Committee at the UNBC. 
- The interviewees would be forwarded a copy of the final paper if desired. 
The interviewees were asked the following questions: 
1. Could you briefly outline your experience and background in Southern Hemisphere 
forestry and in particular with the countries of New Zealand and Uruguay? 
2. What is your opinion and experience on the effectiveness of various forest investment 
incentive programs initiated by country governments and in particular the government 
incentive programs used in New Zealand and Uruguay? 
3. What is your opinion and experience on the importance of country labour laws in 
making forest investment decisions and in particular the existing labour laws of New 
Zealand and Uruguay? 
4. What is your opinion and experience on the importance of country environment laws 
and regulations in making forest investment decisions, both in plantation investments 
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and manufacturing plant investments, and in particular the existing environment laws of 
New Zealand and Uruguay? 
5. What is your opinion and experience on the importance of a country's tax policies in 
making forest investment decisions, both in plantation investments and manufacturing 
plant investments, and in particular the existing tax policies of New Zealand and 
Uruguay? 
6. In your experience, what is the most important government policy or action that 
encourages forest investment and what is the most important government policy or 
action taken that would discourage ongoing or future forest investment in the country? 
7. Are there other government policy areas that you believe are important to forest 
investment decisions made and if so could you explain why you believe they are 
important? 
8. Do you have any additional comments that you would like to make or any questions 
regarding this research? 
The information obtained from the interviews with industry experts provides the basis of the 
analysis section of the paper. The analysis section is organized by the review of the 
questions posed to interviewees. The analysis considers the range of answers provided by 
interviewees and the general consistency or disagreement with information obtained in the 
literature review. 
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ANALYSIS: 
Incentive Programs: 
The literature review identified forest investment incentive programs can be effective when 
targeted to create a critical mass of plantations for a competitive forest industry. The costs 
and benefits from an economic, social and environmental basis need to be considered and 
there needs to be a stable policy environment and land ownership rights within the country to 
attract FDI. These considerations identified in the literature review were expressed a number 
of times in the interviews (with the following type of comments). Government incentives or 
plantation grants in other countries can help establish world scale forest industries such as 
happened in Chile and Brazil (pers. comm. Weyerhaeuser executive 2008). Large scale 
forestry development has not occurred without government incentives of some kind. Some 
countries have initiated the programs to replace imported forest products and create domestic 
industry (pers. comm. Roberts 2009). In general, history has shown that there has been little 
establishment of large blocks of new forest plantations without government incentives of 
some kind. In many cases the government established the plantations and later privatized 
them. In other cases, governments provided favorable tax incentives or tax holidays to 
encourage afforestation projects and related forest products manufacturing (pers. comm. 
Drobnack 2009). In a dissenting view, Binkley (pers. comm. 2008) states that government 
incentives or plantation grants tend to get capitalized into the land prices, making the land 
more expensive in the jurisdiction and benefiting the landowner or seller, rather than creating 
an incentive to the forest plantation owner. Binkley (pers. comm. 2008) offered the example 
of how Chile's plantation subsidies simply made a growing site for radiata pine more 
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expensive in land purchase in comparison to a similar radiata pine growing site in New 
Zealand. 
Attracting FDI will remain evasive, even if subsidies and incentives are present, when the 
policy environment is insecure and unpredictable. This view was also held amongst the 
interviewees. Government incentive programs are more important as a sign of intent by the 
government, identifying that they have a well thought out plan to develop a forest industry, 
that they are proactive and that the forest business is important to the country (pers. comm. 
Clinton 2008). In Uruguay the incentive program offered the opportunity to get comfortable 
with the investment there. The economics became more attractive because of a reduced risk 
on the rotation period of the plantation investment (pers. comm. Weyerhaeuser executive 
2008). Binkley (pers. comm. 2008) stated that government incentive programs are more 
important as a sign of intent by the government. Drobnack (pers. comm. 2009) found that 
regulatory or tax policies which create uncertainty during the period of a long-term forestry 
investment can be very disruptive to the original policy intent to establish forest plantations 
and related converting capacity. 
New Zealand utilized an incentive policy of subsidization of planting and of extension 
services to encourage afforestation on small land holdings. The ability to expense plantation 
establishment and maintenance costs extended to all landowners in 1991 has been New 
Zealand's most effective incentive to encourage plantation establishment. The New Zealand 
government planted half of all the plantation forests up to 1984, and provided research and 
development support to the forest industry. Interviewees considered the 1991 change to tax 
regimes the most significant incentive for New Zealand plantation establishment. 
Establishing plantations as a corporation, a group of investors, or as an individual was and 
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still is incentivized by clear tax laws that allow the costs of planting and plantation 
maintenance to be deducted against other taxable income in New Zealand. The tax rules are 
very practical (pers. comm. Clinton 2008). In New Zealand, the expensing of early costs of 
preparation and planting is beneficial (pers. comm. Drobnack 2009). New Zealand limited 
partnership schemes that allowed offsets against other income were fairly effective (pers. 
comm. Roberts 2009). From 1992 to the early 2000s with the clarity and consistency of tax 
policy, an average of 40,000 hectares a year were planted, primarily Pinus radiata, this was a 
period of optimism in the industry (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). 
Uruguay attempted its first forest investment tax incentive program in 1967, followed by a 
1987 forest promotion law, offering plantation grants and tax exemptions. These programs 
increased total plantation area to 745,000 hectares by 2008. FDI made up 45% ofthat total 
through the initial period and now is closer to 75% in 2009 with total investment exceeding 
US$ 2 billion. General approval of the Uruguayan incentive program was given by 
interviewees. The forest promotion law of 1987 had a goal reaching 200,000 hectares of 
effective planted area in 12 years, with almost 800,000 hectares planted by 2008, the 
incentive more than successful (pers. comm. Ferres 2009). For Uruguayan individuals, 
companies, or institutions with land or capital, the incentive program made it much easier to 
get into plantation ownership (pers. comm. Enrich 2009). The incentive program was very 
focused on the incentives given out because of the land soil class mapping that had been 
done, and the government had a goal for the amount of forest plantation land it wanted to 
achieve (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). The mapping of the soil types within Uruguay was an 
indication of a well thought out plan to develop a forest industry (pers. comm. Binkley 
2008). 
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In summary incentive programs can create a critical mass of forest plantations when stable 
governments and policy exists, and there is secure land ownership tenure. Programs can 
offer plantation grants, tax incentives, or holidays or a government can become directly 
involved in the financing and ownership of plantations. A well thought out incentive 
program is one that is consistent over a longer time period, reduces risks to investors, and 
indicates a sign of intent and interest by the government. The 1991 New Zealand tax policy 
of allowing the expensing of plantation establishment and maintenance costs, and the 
government planting of 550,000 hectares (to 1987) have been the country's most effective 
incentive programs. The 1987 Uruguay forest promotion law with plantation grants and tax 
exemptions and the 1998 law clarifying foreign investor rights, tax holidays for projects of 
national interest and free trade zones for exporting industries, have created a critical mass of 
forest plantations and have supported the further manufacturing plant investment required. 
Country Labour Laws: 
Labour policies desirable for investors include flexibility in labour regulations, a trained 
work force and high educational and literacy standards within the country. Binkley (pers. 
comm. 2008) believes that there is a need to understand responsibilities under local labour 
laws and to work with that knowledge as a component of a business plan. Drobnack (pers. 
comm. 2009) stated that culture very much influences work practices and attitudes towards 
things like safety. Roberts (pers. comm. 2009) stated that when considering the time value of 
money, labour is most important in plantation establishment where liberal labour laws and 
lower costs can reduce the plantation capital investment. 
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New Zealand's regulation changes in labour laws and wages after 1984were considered to be 
important by a number of the interviewees. Longshoreman unions in most countries are 
relatively strong, but work practices in New Zealand prior to the 1990s were especially 
crippling (pers. comm. Drobnack 2009). In the 1970s and 1980s, New Zealand ports did not 
operate 24 hours a day and most ship-loading operations involving forest products were 
halted whenever it rained. These practices were largely been negotiated away in the 1990s, 
and New Zealand ports for awhile held a preeminent position as highly efficient ports for 
forest products (pers. comm. Drobnack 2009). New Zealand has good labour laws now; 
some of the most important components include established safety policies and regulations 
and an educated work force capable of training (pers. comm. Clinton 2008). Labour policy 
can be a moving target, as Neilson (pers. comm. 2009) indicated that the Labour party 
Government (defeated in 2008 general elections), had added another week of paid leave and 
eliminated the three month trial period for new employees. The later policy was promptly 
reversed by the new National party government. 
Interviewee comments regarding labour policy in Uruguay focused on the transition that had 
to occur with the development of a new industry and with companies that were new to 
Uruguay. Clinton (pers. comm. 2008) stated that West Fraser Timber Ltd (West Fraser) had 
concerns about costs in Uruguay, with policies like paying for a 13th month and pension plan 
contributions, but the overall labour cost was still competitive. The largest concern was the 
lack of an industrial safety program and practices, so West Fraser established their own 
programs based on Canadian practices. Weyerhaeuser did the same, and today Uruguay has 
an industrial safety program similar to that of any other developed country (pers. comm. 
Clinton 2008). In Uruguay Ferres (pers. comm. 2009) explained that early afforestation 
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efforts strictly adhered to existing laws, but that the laws were based on agricultural type 
labour and new borders of employment regulation had to be developed. Enrich (pers. comm. 
2009) offered the opinion that with the change of government three years ago in Uruguay, 
labour laws have become more in line with European standards and that the Europeans 
appreciate the consistency with their laws and the clarity of the laws. 
In summary, desirable features of labour include flexibility in regulations, a trained work 
force and high educational standards in the country. New Zealand achieved labour flexibility 
in a deregulation period occurring after 1984. Uruguay had a labour structure that needed to 
adapt to a new forest industry, this included the development of labour standards and a 
response to training demands. 
Country Environment Laws: 
The significant presence of multi-national forest compames and TIMOs in southern 
hemisphere forest countries are causing a convergence of country environment laws to more 
common international standards. The certification of plantations and industrial operations by 
third party groups such as FSC has encouraged this move towards commonality. Drobnack 
(pers. comm. 2009) offered an alternate view that in some developing countries there are 
often attempts to borrow and install environmental regulations developed in other parts of the 
world; this frequently produces confusion and disagreement. Binkley (pers. comm. 2008) 
stated that environmental laws have to be stable; the laws can be dealt with under normal 
business practices if they are not under a constant state of change. 
The 1991 Resource Management Act (RMA) in New Zealand has discouraged investment, 
particularly in manufacturing plants, through its approval process. The view that the RMA is 
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hindering development in the New Zealand forest industry, particularly with mill processing 
capital projects, was common amongst interviewees familiar with the Act. The impacts of 
RMA have been enormous. For instance, under the last Labour government, there were 
companies going through years of permitting approval under the RMA, only to have the 
Environment Minister arbitrarily cancel a company's entire approval process at the last 
moment (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). The RMA has been abused to stop actions of 
businesses that may seem completely unrelated to the environment, such as one supermarket 
chain deliberately blocking another from building a new store (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). 
The RMA is locally driven to an extreme where it is necessary to deal with all neighbours on 
virtually any management change. We experienced numerous delays in trying to locate a 
suitable sawmill site near Nelson (pers. comm. Drobnack 2009). Poorly drafted 
environmental regulations that do not contain clear standards and that allow frivolous 
complaints are easily abused by those who don't like development of any kind (pers. comm. 
Drobnack 2009). New Zealand environment laws have been deal breakers on capital 
investment, especially compared to alternate investments that may be available in Australia 
(pers. comm. Roberts 2009). There is a lack of national guidelines to keep the local councils 
on track with what is a reasonable and rational request. Australia has strict environmental 
laws but the State and National governments are willing to work with the forest companies 
and they encourage industry through infrastructure development (pers. comm. Roberts 2009). 
The literature review found that emission trading schemes and carbon sequestration 
associated with forest plantations have become a contentious issues in New Zealand after the 
government claimed ownership of some of the carbon credits and its planned legislation that 
would tax landowners that did not replant. Interviewees provided further perspectives on the 
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issues. After four years of battles with industry the government has handed back ownership 
of carbon sequestration to landowners, but landowners are now in a situation of having to 
pay back a carbon tax if the plantation is harvested and not replanted. This has created a bad 
relationship between landowners and the government; the new Conservative party 
government is trying to repair this relationship by delaying and reviewing the 
implementation of these carbon policies (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). The liability on the 
landowner is particularly important if the ownership is separated between the tree plantation 
and the land itself (pers. comm. Clinton 2008). 
The literature review did not identify forest environment laws in Uruguay that have 
discouraged investment. The interviewees also found environment laws, on the whole, to be 
acceptable to industry. In Uruguay, there are policies reserving indigenous areas but the 
environmental policies are less onerous because of the gentle landscape (pers. comm. 
Neilson 2009). The forest promotion law dictated detailed technical specifications on how to 
establish a commercial plantation, and it took into consideration many environmental and 
fire protection aspects (pers. comm. Ferres 2009). Such details made it easy for forest 
owners to obtain green certifications under most of the existing worldwide NGO certifiers 
(pers. comm. Ferres 2009). A recent amendment to regulations in 2006 prevents the planting 
of higher value agricultural land. The introduction of law changes initially caused large 
delays as the government did not have the manpower or expertise to enforce the standards. 
Rules have now been clarified and land owners should generally know in advance if the 
potential plantation will be approved (pers. comm. Enrich 2009). 
In summary, environmental laws are converging towards international standards. This is 
influenced by the presence of multi-national forest companies and TIMOs, along with the 
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trend towards third party forest certification. The 1991 New Zealand RMA that allows 
environment decisions at a local council level and interference by the national government, 
can cause delays and stop required investment, particularly in manufacturing. National 
guidelines and government encouragement of investment are needed. Emission trading 
schemes in New Zealand potentially create carbon tax liabilities for plantation owners, which 
can discourage further plantation investments. Uruguay's environmental laws have been 
clear and consistent; which facilitates easier third party forest certification. 
Country Tax Policies: 
Tax policies encouragmg forest investment require governments to have the financial 
flexibility and means to accomplish them. Tax policies are an important factor in 
determining the climate for investment, particularly in developing countries. In general 
interviewees considered a country's tax policy to be one of the most important investment 
factors, aside from suitable climate, soil conditions and land availability in the country. 
Clinton (pers. cornm. 2008) felt that tax policies are more important than any forest 
investment incentive programs. He stated that some countries reviewed by West Fraser had 
tax policies that were difficult to understand, seemed to shift and they lacked clarity. Tax 
policies are positive when they are stable and the government is stable (pers. comm. 
Weyerhaeuser executive 2008). Both plantations and manufacturing plants are long term 
investments that are not easily exited, so stability is important (pers. cornm. Weyerhaeuser 
executive 2008). Drobnack (pers. comm. 2009) believes corporate tax rates and all tax 
policies are critical. The timing of taxes is important in a long-term capital investment like 
plantations, so ad valorem taxes versus taxes at the time of harvest are important distinctions 
(pers. comm. Drobnack 2009). Depreciation allowances, expensing new plantations, tax 
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holidays and plantation incentive programs are all important (pers. comm. Roberts 2009). 
Binkley (pers. comm. 2008) disagreed that tax holidays on plantation investments are 
effective; he believes that the tax holidays tend to get capitalized into land prices and do not 
have a significant impact on the overall investment return or original investment decisions. 
Plantation establishment rates in New Zealand had significant increases when all land owners 
could expense establishment and maintenance costs and a sharp drop in planting between 
1988 and 1991 when the tax incentive was revoked. When the taxation regime was 
reinstated a large increase in planting from 1992 to the early 2000s occurred. As the tax 
policy in New Zealand changed so did the choices to invest or not to invest, depending on the 
tax treatment (pers. comm. Roberts 2008). The interviewees had a generally favorable 
opinion of New Zealand tax policy. New Zealand moved from an onerous tax system in the 
1980's to more of a flat tax system, with a maximum tax rate in the 30% range that is easy to 
understand (pers. comm. Clinton 2008). New Zealand tax policy has the benefits of allowing 
deduction of expenses on plantations as they occur, with the exception of capital expenses. 
Plantation owners still have the cost of property taxes which can be significant over the 
rotation life of the forest plantation (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). 
In Uruguay, the 1987 forest promotion law provided the incentives to attract FDI. Additional 
laws in 1998 attracted more FDI, with the protection of rights of foreign investors, tax 
holidays and free trade zones. The interviewees provided a range of perspectives on 
Uruguay's tax incentives. Weyerhaeuser executive (pers. comm. 2008) stated that tax 
holidays on plantation investments create the opportunity to free up self funding cash flow to 
invest further in plantations without additional external capital. Uruguay needs this 
favorable tax policy because they are earlier in the development cycle of their forest industry. 
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New Zealand has a more established forest industry, and tax incentives are less critical to 
encouraging development (pers. comm. Weyerhaeuser executive 2008). In Uruguay the 
lack of taxation from profits on timber growing, and a future tax policy of zero or low taxes, 
were attractive incentives that reflected the intent of the government to attract foreign 
investment in developing their forest industry (pers. comm. Clinton 2008). Ferres (pers. 
comm. 2009) thought that the income and local tax exemptions have been the main catalyst 
for the successful development of plantations in Uruguay. More importantly, in his opinion, 
is that the tax laws have been maintained since 1987, with minor changes, through successive 
governments and three political parties. Enrich (pers. comm. 2009) added that Uruguay has 
recently simplified its application process for "projects of national interest" to qualify for this 
type of tax exoneration. This is due in part, to competitive pressures from Brazil and 
Argentina that also offer this type of program for large foreign investments (pers. comm. 
Enrich 2009). 
TIMOs and REITs have a tax advantage over traditional forest companies, even in foreign 
countries. TIMOs own over 70% of forest plantations in New Zealand and over 25% of 
plantations in Uruguay. Drobnack (pers. comm. 2009) has particular concerns over the 
accumulation of plantation forests by TIMOs and REITs. His concerns relate to their 
business model being driven by fmancial returns, and his opinion that TIMOs are giving less 
commitment to research and development, industry associations, rural communities than 
traditional forest companies. In addition, they often have no involvement in the 
manufacturing facilities that process the plantation forests. TIMOs and REITs are very 
exposed to any changes in their tax regimes, and any change in the attractiveness of timber 
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assets versus some other asset class could cause a quick flight to other investments (pers. 
comm. Drobnack 2009). 
In summary, tax policies encourage investment when they are stable, clear, and affordable. 
Tax exemptions and tax holidays can be useful in assisting in the establishment of a critical 
mass of forest plantations for a forest industry. The 1991 New Zealand tax policy of 
allowing expensing of plantation establishment and maintenance successfully attracted 
investment. Uruguay tax exemptions and holidays in the laws of 1987 and 1998, along with 
other features, created the critical mass of plantations necessary for a forest industry and the 
manufacturing investment, all supported by significant FDI. 
Government Policies and Actions Encouraging Forest Investment: 
Investors seek out stability in a country's economy, their political system and policies and 
require secure land ownership rights. New Zealand and Uruguay have been successful in 
attracting investment because they have these attributes. 
Interviewees provided a range of general considerations for the encouragement of forest 
investments, with a number of specific country examples. Encouraging factors are tax 
incentives, a stable government, an ability to expense costs, a manageable tax burden, and 
government policies that remain stable (pers. comm. Weyerhaeuser executive 2008). 
Drobnack (pers. comm. 2009) felt that within government there needs to be individuals who 
are champions for the forest industry, who understand the economics and will defend the 
industry against assaults on the value chain. Government policies that encourage investment 
in plantations such as grants or tax holidays are necessary because the time horizon for the 
harvest rotation of a plantation is too long compared to other, more attractive investments 
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(pers. comm. Roberts 2009). Taxation is the single most important policy (pers. comm. 
Clinton 2008). 
The sale of evergreen licences over the majority of the government owned forest plantations 
in New Zealand in the 1990s was very positive for the forest industry (pers. comm. Neilson 
2009). Binkley (pers. comm. 2008) emphasized that government research to mitigate the 
bio-physical risk of growing trees is an important step governments can take to encourage 
investment in forest plantations. For example the research facilities of the New Zealand 
government have done extensive research on Pinus radiata growing conditions in New 
Zealand and everything that a plantation grower might want to know about growing the 
species. 
Uruguay is considered to have a straight forward government that can be understood (pers. 
comm. Enrich 2009. Foreign companies look at many factors including the character of the 
country's population and people, crime rates, personal safety and perceived levels of 
corruption within the government. Paraguay and Argentina are thought to have risks related 
to the levels of government corruption. (pers. comm. Emich 2009). Tax exemptions, clear 
rules on where plantations can be established and maintaining the policy structure over a 
long time period have been the keys to Uruguay's success (pers. comm. Ferres 2009). 
In summary, governments can encourage forest investment by ensuring stability in their 
economy, policies, political system and by ensuring the security of land title. Long-term 
investments in plantations and manufacturing can be made more financially attractive with 
plantation grants, tax exemptions and tax holidays. Governments can also choose to be more 
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directly involved through the ownership of plantations and investment in the research and 
development of silvics, manufacturing and marketing. 
Government Policies and Actions Discouraging Forest Investment: 
Country disincentives are factors that increase risk and uncertainty. They could include high 
tax rates, political risk, lack of infrastructure, restrictions on forest investments or capital 
movements and lack of rule of law. 
In the interviews there were general themes of factors identified that discourage forestry 
investments and specific examples provided. Discouraging factors include risks of political 
change, change in labour or tax policies or differential treatment of foreign investors 
compared to local investors (pers. comm. Drobnack 2009). Drobnack (pers. comm. 2009) 
also believes that policies need to be stable and if governments are considering changes in 
policy, there needs to be chance for input. A rapidly shifting political environment is always 
out of sync with the long-term nature of timber investments. There tends to be more 
variability and less predictability in things arising from politics. Unintended consequences 
also frequently occur (pers. comm. Drobnack 2009). Weyerhaeuser executive (pers. comm. 
2008) felt discouraging factors were govenunents that see the forest industry as a tax 
generating machine and are not willing to support the adequate development of 
infrastructure. 
In recent years, the New Zealand the government has become less business friendly and has 
been focused on other social objectives while ignoring the importance of an exporting forest 
industry to the general economy (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). The RMA process has been 
hijacked, the employment flexibility has been reduced and the unpredictability of Maori 
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consultation required on some projects, has added to a business climate uncertainty (pers. 
comm. Neilson 2009). In New Zealand some sensible national guidelines are needed for the 
guidance of local councils and the RMA. Present practices are a drain on the capacities of 
forest companies, the processing industry is shrinking when it should be expanding and there 
is a lack of domestic manufacturing facilities for the wood growing on the plantations (pers. 
comm. Roberts 2009). New Zealand has not kept up to electricity demand and power 
generation because its desire to avoid thermal generation and stay with hydro generation 
(pers. comm. Neilson 2009). Periods of drought and increased demand, have led to 
uncertainties of electrical availability and costs for any new heavy electrical use industry 
such as a pulp mill or saw mill (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). 
Government interventions such as the new environmental restriction in Uruguay on what 
lands can be planted can discourage investment (pers. comm. Enrich 2009). Uruguay is an 
exporting country and needs to continue to focus its attentions on the port infrastructure in 
Montevideo and the improvement of the rail system (pers. comm. Weyerhaeuser executive 
2008). 
In summary, discouraging government policies and actions are those that add business risk or 
uncertainty. These include changes in politics, labour laws, tax policies or differential 
treatment of foreign investment. In New Zealand the RMA process has caused business 
climate uncertainty. 
Other Government Policies: 
Government policies regarding other industries can influence forest investments. Broader 
government policies like greenhouse gas emissions can impact forest investments also, 
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particularly with the issue of carbon sequestration in forest plantations. The interviewees 
provided both general government policy concerns and country specific examples. 
Government policy needs to be an overall approach to attract foreign investment (pers. 
comm. Drobnack 2009). Clinton (pers. com.m. 2008) stated a history of expropriation of 
foreign assets like Venezuela scares away investment. Additional risk adverse issues that 
could be deal breakers include the safety of employees, the potential language barrier (where 
English is not widely spoken), and an inability to understand rules (pers. comm. Clinton 
2008). Long-tertn political commitment is critical, unfortunately, Latin American countries 
change political direction quite often and forestry is a long-term business (pers. comm. 
Ferres 2009). Water restrictions, shifting rain belts in the world and global warming will 
influence where plantations are established, what species are planted and whether or not the 
country government will support the establishment of the plantations (pers. comm. Roberts 
2009). Carbon trading policies can be a negative or a positive for forest investment, 
depending on how the government handles the issue (pers. comm. Roberts 2009). 
The location of New Zealand in relation to potential customers, negatively affects its 
economics as an exporting country. In contrast, Uruguay has the trading partners of Brazil 
and Argentina adjacent. The forest industries of New Zealand and Uruguay both have very 
small local demand compared to their total production. The New Zealand government needs 
to encourage the forest industry to move up the value chain to offset the longer shipping 
distances (pers. comm. Weyerhaeuser executive 2008). A decision in New Zealand building 
codes to allow kiln dried radiata pine lumber instead of the previous practice of using treated 
lumber created a leaky, rotting home problem in New Zealand's climate and a bad reputation 
for the lumber product domestically. Domestic lumber sales can help to stabilize revenue 
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and business operations in a heavily export-oriented industry. Fortunately lumber companies 
have begun producing treated pine lumber again (pers. comm. Neilson 2009). 
Uruguay has had a government policy that is generally welcoming, whereas Brazil has rules 
that are stacked against foreign investment. Argentina has potential for substantial forest 
investment but it has issues of instability that have to be resolved in order to encourage more 
foreign investment (pers. comm. Drobnack 2009). Uruguay is a MERCOSUR country that 
acts as a gateway to markets in Argentina and Brazil. The government is investing or 
supporting investment in its infrastructures, including electrification of rural areas, expansion 
of its cellular network and fiber optic network system, improving its ports and the road 
highway system (pers. comm. Enrich 2009). 
In summary, government policies in issues like greenhouse gas emissions or agricultural 
subsidies can have an impact on forest investment. Government policy needs to have an 
overall approach that is stable, transparent, supportive through infrastructure improvements 
and encouraging of investment. 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
A critical mass of forest plantations can be created through incentive programs when stable 
governments and policy exist and there is secure land ownership tenure. Tax driven incentive 
programs that are not properly conceived can create plantations where there is no market, (as 
seen in the past in Costa Rica and Brazil), or possibly create plantations of the wrong or 
unproven commercial species (as seen in locations in Australia). A well thought out 
incentive program that is consistent over a longer time period, indicates a sign of intent and 
interest by the government. Uruguay's success in establishing a forest industry has occurred 
because they have met these conditions. 
The 1991 New Zealand tax policies of allowing the expensmg of plantations and the 
government planting of 550,000 hectares have been their most effective incentive programs. 
New Zealand established its critical mass for a plantation based forest industry initially 
through extensive direct government involvement. From 1992 onwards, New Zealand 
almost doubled its plantation area through effective tax policy. 
The 1987 Uruguay forest promotion law (with plantation grants and tax exemptions), and 
the 1998 law (clarifying foreign investor rights, tax holidays for projects of national interest 
and free trade zones for exporting industries), have created a critical mass of forest 
plantations and have supported manufacturing plant investment. Uruguay copied successful 
forest plantation models from other countries, and added other tax policies and laws that 
provided security, comfort and economic advantage for foreign investors versus other 
potential countries. 
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Labour laws that include flexibility in regulations, a trained work force and high educational 
standards in the country are important. The quality of the labour force and the labour costs 
as a factor of production can be a comparative advantage within the influence of government 
policy. Governments should be acutely aware of these factors, particularly if the country is 
primarily an exporting nation. 
Environmental laws are moving towards international standards, influenced by the operations 
of multi-national forest companies and TIMOs, along with the trend towards third party 
forest certification. 
The New Zealand RMA allows environment decisions at a local council level and 
interference by the national government. This can cause delays and stop required 
investment, particularly in manufacturing. National guidelines and government 
encouragement of investment are needed. The application of the RMA process and a non-
business friendly attitude by the New Zealand government are a serious hindrance to the 
forest industry in receiving the capital investment in manufacturing necessary for the 
growing inventory of plantation wood. 
Tax policies encourage investment when they are stable, clear and affordable. Tax 
exemptions and tax holidays can be useful in assisting the establishment of a critical mass of 
forest plantations for a forest industry. 
Discouraging government policies and actions are those that add business risk or uncertainty. 
These include changes in politics, labour laws, and tax policies, as well as differential 
treatment of foreign investment. The New Zealand government created uncertainty with its 
Emission Trading Scheme and ownership claim of carbon sequestration on plantations. 
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These actions still requrre clarification by the present government. Uruguay has been 
relatively consistent in its policies but did create uncertainty in 2006 when environmental 
approval was required for new plantations before the administrative process was available to 
manage the new law. 
Government policy needs to have an overall approach that is stable, transparent, supportive 
through infrastructure improvements and encouraging of investment. FDI and domestic 
investment funds have the flexibility to move to jurisdictions where conditions are the most 
favorable. The forest experts interviewed strongly indicated their desire for stability and 
consistency from government policy, due to the immobility of a forest investment and the 
potential illiquidity of their investment if the country specific risk suddenly experiences a 
change for the worse. Therefore, it can be concluded that even the slightest perception or 
hint of instability or unfavorable conditions in a country can cause forest investment funds to 
avoid that country. 
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